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I want to present in this paper a preliminary sketch of a new, systematic method for syntactic
descriptions that I am developing now under the name ofpattem matching analysis. The basic
idea came to me when I read Lakoff (1993) in which he presents the framework of "cognitive
phonology," on the one hand, and Karttunen (1993) in which he advocates "two-level (declarative)
rule systems," on the other. There are. of course. far from trivial differences in LakofI's and
Karttunen's claims. Lakoff discusses the matter from a PDP<onscious point ofview, and Karttunen
from a more orthodox computational point of view, though he, of course, advances to parallel
computation.) Nevertheless, their claims converge at an interesting point: "derivations" are
dispensable if correspondences (e.g., between underlying and surface forms) are stated both at
input and output.! I find this was a very interesting idea that deserves import into syntactic
descriptions. Trying in and out to give body to this idea, the method, pattern matching analysis.
grew out. This method is, as we will see below, specialized to describe multiple correspondences
among as many surface forms as we wish to compare to provide topological structure of pattern
network. I believe this method is not only useful but also provides us a new way of viewing
syntactic phenomena. This paper is a sort of status report of this new approach.
1.1 What Is Cognitive Phonology?
Let us begin by looking at how LakofI's (1993) cognitive phonology is different from generative
phonology.
Generativists like Halle and Clements (1983, p. 121) claim that Mohawk surface phonetic
form D6 in (1) is "derived from" underlying form Do in (1) by six generative rules, R1 - ~ of the
form X => A/Y_Z in (2) applied in that order. D; indicates that it is ith derivational step.
(1)
(2)
Do: Y e + ii. k + h r e k '" + ? # [=underlying form]
D1: y '" ii. k h r e k '" ? # [by R1]
D2: y '" K k h r e k '" ? # [by~]
D!: y
'"





:S k h r e k e ? # [byRJ
D3: y '" :S k h r e 9 e ? # [byRJ
D6: y '" :S k '" r e 9 e ? # [byRJ
~ Vowel deletion: V-+ '" I_V
~ Stress Assignment: V -+ [+stress] / Co _ <; V Co #
[~Il ]Rs Vowel change: [ii.] -+ til / _ -ant
+nasal
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where null elements are indicated by * for readability.
In LakofI's cognitive phonology. by contrast. the same data is characterized on a completely
different basis. He outlines his approach as follows.
(3) Architecture of Cognitive Phonology:
i. "Cognitive phonology characterizes correspondences between morphemes (as stored
in the mind) and phonetic sequences. We will refer to those as the morphemic and
phonetic "levels" - M-flroel and P-flroe~ respectively. In addition, we posit one
intermediate level, the phonemic level, at which among other things, constraints on
word level phonology are stated; we shall call this the WflroeL" I take these to be
minimal collection of necessary dimensions of phonological structure~ I also think
they are all that is necessary." (ibid., p. 118)
ii. "Cognitive phonology is set within a general autosegmental phonological framework.
I assume that the ultimate formal framework for this approach "'ill be a form of PDP
connectionism [... ] which is a simultaneous constraint satisfaction system." (Lakoff
1993, p. 118)4
(4) Mechanism of Cognitive Phonology:
i. "Generative rules (by which I mean rules of the sort familiar to us from Chomsky and
Halle 1968) are replaced by constructions, which state well-formedness constraints within
levels and correlations across levels." (ibid., p. 118)
ii. "In the default case, there is identity across levels. Cross-level constructions override
such defaults. Other default cases, both language-specific and universal, are possible."
(ibid., p. U8)
iii. "Cross-level constructions are diredion-neutra~and are indeed to be used directly in
either production and recognition." (ibid., p. 118)
iv. "Constructions combine by superposition. That is, each construction imposes a set of
constraints, and the constraints of the various constructions are simultaneously
satisfied," (ibid, p. 118)
Under these general assumptions, Lakoff claims that the correspondence between the underlying
and surface forms in (1) can be expressed in tenns of correspondence as stated in (5).5
(5) M: y e + A k + h r e k + 1#
C. and C t satisfied
W: y * .. k h r e k * 1#A
I I I c,-e; satisfied
P: y * 5 k * r e 9 e 1#
In this case, the correspondence between M- and W-level forms results from the "simultaneous
satisfaction" of two constructions, ~ and Ct , that Lakoff states as in (6), on the one hand, and
the correspondence between W- and P-level fonns from C,c,. on the other.
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(6) C1 M: V + V C; W: X Co V Co #; if X=V, then X=[+stress]
I
W: •
[-~II]~ W: A -ant C. W: h r
+nas
P: j P: •
C5 M: 7 h r ~ P: V XV; ifX=[+obstruent], X=[+voiced]
I
W: • *
C, W: [ ] • [ ]
I I
P: C e 7 #
According to LakofI (1993, pp. 120-121), ~ is Vowel Omission, stating that "the first of two
consecutive vowels at level M does not appear at level W." C; is Stress, stating that "At W, a
vowel that is penultimate is stressed." ~ is Vowel Change, stating that "W-Ievel [X] corresponds
to P-level [5]." C. is h-Deletion, stating that "an Ihl preceding an Irl at W does not appear at
P." ~ is Cluster Simplification, saying that "a sequence 17hrl at M appears as Ihl at W." C6 is
Voicing, saying that "at level P, intervocalic stops occur voiced." c; is Epenthesis, saying that
"when C precedes 7# at level W, an lei absent at level W intervenes at level P (The W-Ievel
representation" [ ] [ ]" indicates that the ICI and 17I are adjacent at W)."
Furthermore, constructions ~-c, fall into two major categories: "cross-level" and "intralevel"
constructions. More specifically, ~ in (6) is a construction across M- and W-levels. C2 is a
W-intemal one. ~, C.' Cs, and C, are constructions across W- and P-Ievels. ~ is a P-intemal one.
Crucial points are: (i) representations at different levels are "associated" to one another,
rather than derived from one to another, and (ii) M-W and W-P correspondences in (5)
embody no intermediate steps for derivation. M- and W-Ievel representations are associated to
one another in a "single" step (superposition of ~ and C,), and so is the association of W- and
P-Ievel representations (superposition of c;-C;l:
On this basis, Lakoff asserts that "the Mohawk data do not in themselves show the need for
ordered rules and derivations, since they can be accounted for with equal generality using
cognitive phonology. What this shows is that ordered rules and derivations may well be an
epiphenomenon of assuming the existence of generative rules that apply in order and manipulate
symbols one step at a time" (ibid., 123).
1.2 What Makes Cognitive Phonology "Cognitive"?
The replacement of (1) by (5) is not merely a technical improvement, or a "notational variant"
of the same conception. Let us see why.
Lakoff begins his paper by posing the following two questions about the cognitive reality
about generative phonology.
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Q: Do people go through these step-by-step derivations in their heads every time they
pronounce a sentence?
Q,: What makes derivations cognitively real if the immediate stages never occur in the
minds of speakers?
He recollects that he got an absolutely negative answer to Q, one the one hand, and "performance-
competence" answer to Q,. on the other.
LakofI argues. then, that such justification is quite dubious if we take it into consideration
that "[c]onnectionist cognitive science suggests that the brain is the mind and that anything
that is cognitively real is represented in the brain" (ibid., p. 117; see also McClelland et aL, 1986;
Rumelhart et aL, 1986; Davis, ed. 1992 for parallel distributed processing (PDP) framework). In
short, Lakoffs cognitive phonology is cognitive if (or as far as) PDP models are cognitive.
1.3 If Phonology Can Be Done "Cognltively," So Must be Syntax
I think that Lakoffs challenge should affect on the study of syntax. In this sense, my attempt is
to develop a framework of "cognitive" syntax in conformity with Lakoffs cognitive phonology.
But before going on into details directly, let us turn for a while to another, seemingly "less
cognitive" aspect of the issue.
1.4 AStrange Convergence
Since Karttunen's (1993) discussion may seem to be too technical to most linguists, let me skim
his main points here.
Karttunen suggests that what LakofI calls constructions are "avo-level rules" in the sense of
Koskenniemi (1983). Two-level rules are statements of correspondence which may specify condi-
tions at input and output at the same time. By contrast. he points out, generative "rewriting"
rules are one-level rules which may not specify conditions at output. He remarks that there is no
difference in weak generative capacity between one-level and two-level rule systems. But. by
virtue of this equivalence, two-level systems are more useful, since they can dispense with rule
ordering altogether (of course, at the expense of more complexity in statements). Karttunen
remarks, drawing on other important works byJohnson (1972) and Kaplan and Kay (1981), that
tllis almost miracle is attainable as far as cross-level correspondences constitute "regular" or
"type 3" relations.6 and he calls this constraint "finite-state constraint."
I said just above that Karttunen's discussion is "less cognitive." But please do not take this
literally. Its real meaning is that it is "indirectly cognitive," and, for evidence, Lakoffs and
Karttunen's arguments against generative phonology converge at an interesting point.
Some of us might be surprised if I say that LakoJIs "connectionist" and Karttunen's "orthodox"
computational approaches converge; but they really do, if I do not misunderstand. Their claims
converge at their emphasis on the reality of computation, irrespective of neural or not. In this
respect, it is necessary to recall that neural networks are not only cognitively real but also
computationally real. The reason is obvious: neural nets are computational systems in and by
themselves.
1.5 FInite-State Syntax?
It is of course very risky to assume that syntactic relations can be basically handled in terms of
regular relations, since the descriptive power of regular expressions is very restricted. This
assumption in effect runs counter to the motivation for transformational analysis in the period
of early generative grammars. Chomsky (1957, 1975) conducted arguments to show that natural
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language, e.g., English, is somewhere within context-sensitive (type 1) language, ifnot unrestricted
(type 0) language.' It follows that most of natural languages, if not all, are not even context-free
(type 2), let alone regular (type 3).8
We have a crucial question here: What does it mean that natural language is a type n
language (n ranges between 0 and 3, possibly fractional)? More exactly, if our "competence"
can be identified with a type 1 grammar in fonnal sense, does it mean that our "performance"
produces a type I language? And, if not, is there any significance in showing that our competence
equates with type 1 grammar, while our performance equates with type 2, or 3 grammar?
We have a good piece of evidence to show that finite-state constraint is also working in
syntax. Elman (1992) argues that so-called "subjacency condition" (Chomsky 1973), which,
roughly speaking, blocks movements across more than two bounding nodes (NP and S (= CP»,
could never be operative if grammar performs infinite, "real" recursions. Two problems arise:
first, why an element in pushdown stores is "visible" if real recursion takes place. Second, why
there can ever exist such an upper limit on the number of bounding nodes.
Elman argues that, if subjacency condition is ever operative, which we assume is true, then
the fact by itself proves that grammar does not perform real recursion. What it performs is
"leaky" recursion. We can even draw another conclusion: subjacency condition. if anything. is
not part of "competence" theory, but part of "performance" theory, since competence will never
know any such upper limit. In short, it is a contradiction both to require, on the one hand, that
the grammar of English permits infinite recursion in terms of competence, and to require, on
the other. that the subjacency condition is true, if the latter condition is part of "universal
grammar."
In this respect, Elman's (1992) argument for finite means echoes with Karttunen's finite-state
constraint. Indeed. finite-state property may have an important bearing on the behavior range
of neural networks. This is. I believe, a piece of evidence to show that some sort of Karttunen's
finite-state constraint is operative in syntax, too. It is not unlikely that most, if not all, of syntax
can be characterized by finitary devices.
1,6 And We Will Have "Cognitive" Syntax Some Day ••.
Since cognitive phonology is a bot,h neurally and computationally realistic performance theory
of phonology, if we have a neurally/computationally realistic performance theory of syntax, it
must be "cognitive syntax." Cognitive syntax will be part of "cognitive grammar," which Fauconnier
(1994), Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1987, 1991), and Yamanashi (1995) are representatives of.
But there is not cognitive syntax yet. Without any malicious intention, I would like to say that
cognitive grammar lacks syntactic component, while we already have semantic and pragmatic
components almost in maturity.9 I wish to fill this gap somehow, the best that I can.
I shall talk in what follows as if there is already cognitive syntax as a virtual whole of syntactic
theories that we will have some day, to which the following sketch of an approach is intended to
be a contribution.
2. How "Syntax" Is Conceived In Cognitive Syntax
The primary goal of cognitive syntax is, like LakofI's cognitive phonology and Karttunen's
two-level rule systems, to reduce, or eliminate ifpossible, the role of derivations from the area of
syntax. But this would be a mere day dream without an alternative method, as powerful as
derivational analysis. In this first preliminary section, I want first to settle some conceptual and
terminological issues that may cloud the way to reach that goal.
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2.1 Formations and Correspondences
Syntax is not a monolithic object Most syntactic studies seem to conflate two essentially different
kinds of objects, namelyfonnations oflinguistic expressions (e.g., sentences) and correspondences
among formations. Simply put, formations are linear arrangements of units on the selectional
basis. Linguistic forms are results of formations. Sentence John sings strange songs every day, for
example, is a result of formation over the set of units U= {John, sings, strange, songs, every day},
and, on smaller scales, of U'= {fohn, sing, -s (for tense), strange, song, -s (for plural), every, day},
though relevant scales are not coherent. Thus, more generally, if we let U= lu» ..., u"L then we
could say that forms (e.g., sentences, phrases, words) of a language are appropriate linear
arrangements over U on respective scales of units. Of course, it is lexical selection, rather than
arrangement by themselves, that determines a set of units relevant to formations.
It is clear, however, that formation is not everything of syntax. Consider the relation between
John sings strange songs every day and WhatJohn sings every day are strange songs. None of us would
deny that this relation is also part of syntax. But the relation between the two sentences is not of
formation. It is another kind of relation about "pairs of formations." More exactly, this kind of
relation need not be confined to pairs of formations. Just like a formation is defined as a
relation over an appropriate set of units U={1t l , .. , u"l, this, the latter kind of relation is a
relation over an appropriate set of formations F={J;, .oo, f,,}, usually of sentences. This relation is
exactly what we will call correspondences among forms.
2,2 Nature of Correspondence
We will not be concerned with formations in this paper. We will not be concerned with all kinds
of correspondence, either. Let me first make this point clear.
Correspondence that can be handled in s}'lltactic terms has two aspects: correspondence
between form and meaning, on the one hand, and correspondence between one fonn and
another. Let us call the former kind form-meaning (fm) correspondence; and the latter form-form
(ff) correspondence. To make tllis point clearer, suppose we have a pair of sentences, s and s'.
Obviously, sand s' are in the relation of fro correspondence. There are, in addition, cor-
respondences betweenfandj, one the one hand, and between m and m', on the other. Such






The two fm correspondence in this figure, namely p(f, m) and P(J, m'), mediate an fm
correspondence, r(f,j), and ameaning.meaniug (mm) correspondence, y'( m, m 1.
Note incidentally that what Lakoff (1993), in conformity with Goldberg (1995), Langacker
(1987), calls grammatical constructions are fm correspondences in our sense, not ff correspon-
dences. Our ff correspondences will fit the notion of "network of constructions," as will become
clear. With the distinction above, what we will try to deal with in cognitive syntax is ff cor-
respondences of whatever sort
It will be helpful to give names to the two dimensions of correspondences. As Figure 1
illustrates, we have dimensions P (P, p' E P) and R (r, r' E R). P is the dimension in which fIn
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correspondences are definable. R is the one in which IT and mm correspondences are definable.
We may furthermore assume that P is the dimension of predication, and, for this reason, we
may also assert, if we adopt Langacker's (1987) terminology, that P is the dimension of symbol-
ization in which m is symbolized by means off
For illustration, let f= John sings strangt songs roery day and m= JOHN SINGS STRA..1>;GE SONGS EVERY
DAY; f = What John sings roery day art strangt songs and m'= WHAT JOHN SINGS EVERY DAY ARE STRANGE
SONGS. For f, we have such pieces of fm correspondences as pJ(]ohn/_ sings strangt songs roery
day, JOHN/_SINGS STRANGE SONGS EVERY DAY), ... , Ps(roery day/John sings strangt songs _. EVERY
DAY/JOHN SINGS STR.-\NGE SONGS _). Also for f, we have similar pieces of fm correspondences, e.g.,
P' \(what/_John sings every day art strangt songs, WHAT/_jOHN SINGS EVERY DAY AIlE STRANGE SONGS):o
These pieces of fin correspondence is clearly what Langacker (1987, 1991) calls "symbolic
links."
So far so good, but it is quite unfortunate that we don't have a proper name for R It seems
that this lends to the claim that r's are independent of r"s. Most of disputations over the
so-called "autonomy of syntax," which I find are totally sterile, wiIl be avoidable only if we
identify R so that rand r' are two "modes" of R's manifestation. Let us call R (syn)tactic
dimension In this regard, r may be called anyone of phono(syn) tactics, morpho(syn)tactics,
morphophono(syn) tactics, on the one hand, and T may be called semo(syn) tactics, or conceptu-
alization, ifwe rely on Langacker's (1987) term again.
2.3 Direct and Indirect Motivations of Correspondence
For clarity, however, it wiIl be helpful to say that ff correspondences are "directly" motivated by
r, and "indirectly" by T. For the same reason, mm correspondences are directly motivated by",
and indirectly motivated by r.
Importantly, if we understand Figure 1 correctly, it is clear that rand T are dependent of
each other. Indeed, every r is a reflection of y', on the one hand, and T is a reflection of y, on
the other. We may claim that (i) there cannot be any morphotactics without semotactics-against
those who set priority of syntax over semantics, and likewise (ii) there cannot be any semotactics
without morphosyntactics, either-against those who set priority of semantics over syntactics.
3. Pattern Matching Analysis
Based on the notion of ff correspondence defined above, I wiIl in this section introduce the
basics of pattern matching analysis. The method is intended to be as much effective as derivational
analysis. But before going on to details directly, it will be helpful to make a few remarks.
3.1 Why "Method"?
We should first distinguish two things explicitly: our "research program" in the sense of Lakatos
(1970, 1977)11 and our "method" of analysis. The name of our research program is "cognitive
grammar," which Fauconnier (1994), Fillmore, Kay and O'Comer (1988), Lakoff (1987), Lan-
gacker (1987, 1991), Yamanashi (1995) are representatives of. The works mentioned here and
other works related to or stimulated by them (mine included) have one intellectual attitude in
common: they have more interest in "performance" theory than "competence" of grammar.
Whatever research program we may work within, our investigation inevitably has another
technical aspect as far as it is a scientific enterprise. We need a method, or algorithm, more or
less explicitly defined and proven to work in an expected way. I think this aspect is independent
ofwhat research program we participate in. As Lakatos correctly pointed out, research programs
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determine the "domain" of research, and. more importantly. researcher's way of looking at
phenomena. To put it somewhat technically, our observations are "theory-laden" (Hanson 1958).
But methods are relatively independent of the choice of a research program. It is common
that the same method is used among "incommensurable" paradigms.12 So, to put it extremely,
we may make use of methods in generative grammars. e.g., tree-based analysis, in cognitive way.
though I do not attempt to do it in this paper.
To the method that I will make use of throughout, I will refer as pattern matching method
for syntactic analysis, or simply as pattern matching analysis.
Again, the name of our research program is "cognitive grammar," and what we are trying to
develop as an integral part of cognitive grammar is "cognitive syntax." The name of the method
that we make use of to achieve this end is pattern matching analysis.
3.2 Why "Pattern Matching"?
Pattern matching is an old-fashioned term, as Yamanashi (p.c.) rightly pointed out to me. He
recommended me to use other term ifpossible. But I decided to retain it, since, as far as I know,
linguistics has never exhausted real potentials of pattern matching.
The term pattern matching, I think, has at least two advantages. First, it is a term suggestive
enough to remind us that it has certain relevance to "pattern association" which is used commonly
in the PDP framework to denote the activity at neural scale (Rumelhart, et aL 1986; McClelland,
et aL 1986). Although the meaning of "pattern" is not exactly the same in pattern matching and
pattern association, I find more conceptual similarity than dissimilarity. Second, the term makes
explicit its relevance to "regular relations," which result from finite-state constraint in the sense
of Karttunen (1993). For these reasons, I decided to retain this old-fashioned term.
3.3 An Overview
Pattern matching analysis is, first and foremost, a comparative method to capture properties of
ff correspondences. To see this, it is helpful to look at Figure 1 again.
What we usually call sentences, or more generally linguistic expressions, are correspondences
of the form p(f. m), which are, in our terms, fm correspondences. Of course, it is possible to
state the correspondence as symbolizations ofm in terms ofj, but it is important to note here
that not all fm correspondences are linguistic expressions. An fm correspondence is a linguistic
expression only ifj is a "linguistic" form, though without a clear definition of linguistic.
It is also important to note that formal strings of symbols without meaning associated with
them are not linguistic expressions in our sense, let alone being sentences. So, in our framework,
the notion of "grammaticality" (Chomsky 1965) plays little role. If there is an analogue to the
notion, it must be that of formations. But it is very likely that formations offand m are mutually
dependent of each other. So, it is difficult, if not impossible ideally, to isolate fformations from
m-formations, and vice versa. Metaphorically put, trying to achieve it would suffer from the same
kind of dilemma as we know Sheylock, a merchant of Venice, experienced when he was allowed
to take one pound of breast meat, but without any blood bleeding. So, isolation offformation
from m-formation is, in short, only ideally possible, but practically impossible.
Let us now tum to the details of ff correspondences. As noted above, any ff correspondences
have direct and indirect motivations. An ff correspondence is directly motivated in terms of r,
and indirectly in terms of r'. Pattern matching analysis tries to describe direct motivations
among formations.
3.4 Partial Matches and Mismatches
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Loosely speaking, we may identify fonns as patterns, though their exact meaning are different.
We will return to this issue in §4.7.
Given this rather loose idea of patterns, we need furthennore the notions of partial matches
and mismatches to state ff correspondences in tenns of pattern matching. To make this point
clear, let us consider the if correspondence between (7a) and (7b).
(7) a. They loaded bricks in(to) the truck.
b. They loaded the truck with bricks.
Leaving aside the fm and mm correspondences, their if correspondence can be illustrated as in
(8), where F and G are "canonicalized" fonn of (7a) and (7b). respectively.
(8) F: They loaded bricks in the truck • •
G: They loaded • •
I I
the truck with bricks
What (8) embodies are: there are partial mismatches between F and G with respect to brick.s, in,
with, and there are partial exact matches with respect to other positions.
Do not be ~o curious about the details of (8), especially about the strange elements, symbolized
by" • "to which I will refer as "phantoms." (8) is presented here only for the sake of illustration.
The principal aim of this section is to give foundations to describe ff correspondences such as in
(8). I will present the basic assumptions and relevant notions to make sense of (8) in what
follows, step by step.
3.5 Three Remarks
Three remarks should be made here, however. to avoid possible misunderstandings of what we
will see. We assume specifically:
(9) I. Correspondences like (8) claim no identity in meaning between F- and G-fonns. The
contrary is true: since F and G are different fonns, they can never be identical in
meaning, either. I will discuss this issue under the notion of default difference in
§4.5.
II. Correspondences like the one above claim no derivation from one fonn to the other,
since in (8) none ofF and G is an "underlying" fonn.
III. Correspondence like the one above does not rely on the notion of "levels."
The last two assumptions are crucially different from the case of phonology that we have seen in
§3. Phonological correspondences are correspondences between fonns at different levels, say,
morphophonemic, phonemic, and phonetic. Cognitive phonology, for example. succeeds in
elimination of "derivations" at the expense of crucial reliance on the identification of phonological
levels. Indeed, nothing will remain if there are no such levels.
3.6 Levels as Scales of Units
It is possible to think that ff correspondences are level-internal correspondences rather than
cross-level ones. But this brings about a number of questions: What is the level of syntax? Is
there a level of syntax, or, alternatively, are there levels of syntax? Do surface fonns have
underlying forms? To avoid such embarrassing problems, I want to take a radical position. I
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simply assume that there may be an arbitrary number of levels. More specifically, we identify
levels as "scales" on which we can recognize different sorts of "patterns."I~In this view, what we
call syntax does not correspond to some unique level. Rather, syntactic relations are interactions
of a variety of scales, though relatively larger ones. John sings strange songs every day, for example,
consists of Us= (John sings strange songs every day), on the scale of S (for sentences). but it consists
of U,;= (John. sings, strange songs, every da)i on the scale of P (for phrases); it consists of UII'= (John,
sings, strange, songs. every. day) on the scale W (for words); of UM= (fohn, sing. os, strange. song. os,
every, day) on the scale of M (for morphemes). Note thatJohn, for example. has the same form
on P, W, and M scales. Note also that these by no means exhaust the possible scales: there may
be intermediate scales such that the sentence in question consists of Us '= (John sings strange
songs. every da)l. or U/= (John, sings strange songs every da)t or Ur"= (John, sings strange songs. every
dlJ)i. Patterns have matching scales of their own. Thus, we understand the question of linguistic
levels as the question of constraints on scaling, which should prmide answers to the question of
why there may not be scales like H on which the sentence consists of UIi= (John sing. -s strange.
songs every da)i. This suggests that "consitituency" is an effect of scaling. and need not be
determined "uniquely."
Bearing the three remarks stated in (9) in mind. let us turn to the details of pattern
matching analysis.
3.7 Canonlcallzatlon of Partial MatchesIMismatches
It is important to note that virtually any pattern matching that we will treat in terms of ff
correspondence is "partial." To show this is quite easy. Let patterns F and G be ABCD and
ACBD. Obviously, matching between F and G is not total, simply because they are different
patterns. A pattern matching is total if and only if two patterns match exactly. So, trivially, no
pattern matches anything but itself.
To meet the requirement of finite-state constraint (Karttunen 1993). we also want bidirec-
tiona1lty (= what Lakoff calls direction-neutrality) to hold between F and G. so that ff cor-
respondences are descriptions of the relations between two, or more. surface forms. This re-
quirement necessitates. however. that matching is total: otherwise. bidirectionality can never
hold. So, we need some special procedure to make a partial matching total. This procedure will
be called canonicalization.
3.8 Phantoms
One obvious. and I believe plausible. way to achieve this is to make use of a sort of "wild card"
that matches anything. Thus. (10) is a possible, though not unique. canonicalization of pattern
matching between F =ABCD and G =ACBD. where the special symbol " • " is a wild card to match
any subpattern. Let us call them "phantoms."
(l0) Pattern Matching ofF and G (Canonicalization I)
P. A· BCD
.1.i .1.i .1.i .1.i .1.i .1.i
G: A C B • D
where bidirectionality is indicated by ".1.i".
In cases like this, two patterns Fand G match partially in that A. B. and D on one side have
exact matches on other side. but C dl)esn ·t. The OCC1,lTrences of C. namely C/AB_D (part ofF)
and C/A_BD (part of G). have no "exact" match on the other side. For cases like this, we say
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thatF and G "mismatch" (only) with respect to C.
3.9 Two (and Only Two) Principles of Canonlcallzatlon
The canonicalization procedure to obtain (10) tacitly assumes two specific principles, which can
be stated explicitly as (llA) and (lIB), respectively.
(11) A. Maximal Partial Matches
Pattern matching must be so canonicalized that there be a maximal number of partial
matches.
B. Minimal Partial Mismauhes
Pattern matching must be so canonicalized that there be a minimal number of partial
mismatches.
As we will see, most, if not all, of our interesting results are consequences of these principles
(1lA) and (lIB).
We will never claim, however, that the principles are part of "universal grammar" (Chomsky
1965, 1981, 1995), partly because to claim so is to claim virtually ~othing, and partly because we
can interpret that they are rather mere consequences of the mind/brain's inherent tendency
toward "optimal" states.H
Some of us may feel that (llA) and (lIB) are equivalent. But it is not true. For evidence, we
need (llA) to exclude cases like (l2), one the one hand, and (lIB) to exclude cases like (13),
on the other.
(12) F: A B C D
J,i J,i












It is easy to see that (12) can have more partial matches (with respect to either B or C), and
consequently does not satisfy (1lA). By contrast, (lIB) can have less phatoms, since - A:A - can
be reduced toA:A.
3.10 Ambiguity of Canonlcallzatlon
It is important to note, however, that (10) is not a unique canonicalization. Principles (11A) and










Note that, although (10) and (14) are symmetrical, we have to think of them as two different
pattern matchings. An obvious reason is that they specify different things. (10) specifies that F
and G have analyses A-BCD and AClJaD, respectively, while (14) specifies that they have
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analyses AB C-D and A -CBD, respectively.
This point will be made clearer ifwe look at (15), where E and E' are different.
(15) F: A
-
B Cz D P. A B) C
-
D
J.i J.i J.i J.i J.i J.i H J.t J.t J.t J.t J.i
E: A C, B Cz D E': A B) C B2 D
J.t J.i J,t J,i J.t J.t H J,i J,i J.t J.t J.i





The difference ofE and E' is enough to distinguish between canonicalizations in (10) and (14).
Thus, any decision between them will be arbitrary unless it is based on other independent
reasons.
3.11 Meaning of Bldlrectlonality
We have no proper interpretation ofbidirectionality, however. More specifically, pattern matching





Correspondences state only input condition
Correspondences state only output condition
Correspondences state both input and output conditions
Our rejection of levels makes interpretations A and C invalid, because there cannot be input
conditions of whatever sort. If there is an analogue to input condition, ,it will be constraints on
fO,rmation. But, it is clear that well-formedness of Fhas nothing to do with that of G, even if G is
unacceptable, and vice versa. For this obvious reason, we are safe to decide to take interpretation
B. That is, pattern matching state output well-formedness on both sides, without stating input
condition.
3.12 Notational Convention
It is obvious that (10) is redundant for notational purposes, especially when we see it in light of
default specification In fact, notations like (10) can be simplified if we assume that exact
matches are default. Thus, for expository purposes, we have such notation as (17) for abbreviation
of (10)', where only partial mismatches are specified as they are, assuming that partial matches











It is easy to see that (17) shares a lot of properties with Lakoff's "constructions" presented in
(6). But there is a crucial difference: "default identity" in the sense of Lakoff holds only ofA, B,
D. But we extend the notion of default identity so that it weakly holds also of C. It follows that in
canonicalizations like (17), there is no insertion (=epenthesis) or deletion in real sense.
3.13 Pattern Matching Embodies No "Movements"
The F-G correspondence in (17) is the general scheme of pattern matching which is, as we will
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see below, powerful enough to enable us to state any kind of ff correspondences. But, since
correspondences like (17) may appear as if they describe "movement" of C. we have to make a
few remarks to reject this conception.
It is sure that pattern matching like (17) looks like a derivation, relative to our point of view.
Indeed, if viewed as a mapping from F to G, (17) gives us the impression that C is moved
leftward. But the contrary is also true. It gives us the impression that C is moved rightward, if
viewed as a mapping from G to F.
Such derivational interpretation involves two misunderstandings in it. First, most crucially, it
is incompatible with our rejection of "underlying" forms specified in (9): neither F nor G is the
underlying form of the other. Rather, they are both surface forms of their own status. Second,
even if the notion of underlying forms is abandoned, movement of C in (17) is an apparent
effect at best. The reason is as fol1ows. What (17) minimal1y specify is rather co-occurrence
restrictions such that in F, C is absent in A_B and present in B~, on the one hand, and in G.
C is present in A_B, and absent in B_D, on the other. The correct way to capture this is that C
is not (or may not be) present in A_B and B_D at the same time. A straightforward interpretation
of this is thus that F and G are different optimal solutions of the co-occurrence restrictions on
*E=ACJBG,D, in (I8), with respect to the presence ofC.
(18) F: A • B c; D
I
*E: A C. B ~ D
I
G: A C, B • D
Given E is an inadmissible pattern, F and G are optimal solutions of E so that in F, C is allowed
to appear in B_D (and accordingly C is disallowed to appear in A_B), whereas in G, C is
allowed to appear in A_B (and accordingly C is disallowed to appear in B_D).
3.14 ARemark on "Underlying" Forms
We have to concede here that there will be no contradiction in saying that E is the underlying
form ofF and G. It is not clear what we could benefit from such identification, but it is at least
compatible with our position to accept this identification only when E can never surface as it
stands.
3.15 Pattern Matching Is NotTransformation
To convince some skeptical readers of the points discussed so far, it wil1 not be a waste of time
(and paper) to try to compare the notion of transformation in early generative grammar with
pattern matching method in our analysis. Take the case of correspondence between active and
passive forms for touchstone.
In early generative grammar, active-passive correspondence was stated in terms ofpennutation
such as in (19), where I follow the notational convention devised by Rosenbaum (1967) (d.
Ross (1986, p. 2».
(19) F: NP V NP
1 2 3 => Passive
0 0 3 be 2 -enlrj 1
(= NP be V -en lrj NP)
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& noted, pennutation requires "index" (e.g., 0, 1, 2, ... ) as auxiliary device, since it changes the
position of units.
By contrast, the same relation will be stated as in (20), if based on our pattern matching
analysis by relying on the notions of partial matches/mismatches with phantoms as an auxiliary
device, ignoring the alternate possibility of canonicalization to reverse the relation ofF and G
regarding the object NP.
(20) F:
G:
NP V NP •
I I







where some morphological details, especiaIly NP's value for case, are omitted for expository
purposes.15
It is inevitable that transfonnation and pattern matching have certain resemblance. But this
is simply because of a factual demand: both try to state the relationship of two fonns. To put it
differently, the two methods of analysis are similar only to that extent.
Though there are many crucial differences to be pointed out, let me emphasize here only a
few of them. First, in transfonnational analysis, passive fonn (l9G) is allowed as far as the rule of
Passivization (19) generates it, since the relation between them is that of "derivation" of G from
F. In our pattern matching analysis, by contrast, passive and active fonns are simply different
patterns whose relation is statable as in (20). Second, as a consequence of the first point, be, -en
and by are not "grammatical formatives" that have no meanings.'6 The contrary should be true:
they must be meaningful elements that indispensably contribute the meaning construction of
G. We will return to some relevant details of this correspondence in §4.I5.
3.16 Phantoms Are Not "Empty Categories"
It is natural if some of us have a question about characteristics of phantoms: Aren't phantoms
"empty categories"? The answer is of course negative. Let me specify this.
Phantoms are not real elements of fonns: they are "ephemeral," if I could say so, and indeed
I call them phantoms for this reason. The reason is obvious:
(i) Phantoms are not necessitated by so-called "phrase markers" like [s NP [vp V NP]],
whether base or derived; and
(ii) Instead, phantoms are necessitated by the interaction of principles (llA, B), which
request that there be maximal matches and minimal mismatches in any pattern match-
ing.
(iii) Phantoms appear only when fonns are compared; and
(iv) Once requested by principles of pattern matching, phantoms appear anywhere.
In short, motivation for phantoms is not derivational at all.
3.17 No Derivation but Correspondence Among Forms
Let us summarize here the essential points in this section. Pattern matching analysis is a method
to replace the derivational view of syntactic relations, especiaIly those that can be characterized
in tenns of ff correspondences. To take this position, we have such strong reasons as stated
below.
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A. Derivations are not real. We need additional assumptions (e.g., competence/perfor-
mance distinction) to give it reality.
B. Derivations presuppose theoretical constructs such as wunderlying" fonns.
C. Derivations complicatedly ordered make grammar, if any, "unlearnable."
Under these foundations, let us now tum to concrete analyses.
4. Sample Analyses
This section offers a few sample analyses to display the descriptive power of pattern matching
analysis. There will be far more sets of facts that our method could handle, but we cannot be of
course exhaustive. Furthennore, the syntactic phenomena are selected fairly randomly, without
any intention to be systematic. In addition, all analyses are highly tentative.
By doing this, we will examine several kinds of partial mismatches relevant to syntactic
descriptions. We will see (i) the notion of contrast defined, (ii) positional and lexical mismatches
distinguished, (iii) the notion of matching scales introduced, (iv) the notion of synchronization
required, (v) the notion of topology of contrasts introduced, and (vi) the notion of pattern
network defined.
4.1 Correspondences and Contrasts
It is trivial to note that in ff correspondences, there are contrasts (i) wherever there are partial
mismatches, and (ii) as many as partial mismatches. The reason is obvious: any pattern exactly
matches no pattern other than itself (reflexivity holds).
This means that virtually all correspondences that we treat in terms of pattern matching will
have one or more contrasts. We say that contrast is minimal if the number of such mismatches is
one. In (21), F minimally contrasts with G with respect to always.
I
G: She is always beautiful
(21) F: She is • beautiful
No matter how trivial, we will try to describe seriously this kind of relation in tenns of IT
correspondence, not because it is the easiest to describe, but because this is one of the possible
correspondences that we can find in the syntax of English and many other languages. We will
refer to this kind of partial mismatches as positional mismatches.
Note however that the meaning of the correspondence in (21) is not like (22).
(22) F: She is [AnV e ] beautiful
I
G: She is always beautiful
What is rejected here is to identify phantoms as so-called "empty categories" (Chomsky 1981).
As explained in §3.16, phantoms are wephemeral" elements that emerge only when different
fonns are wcompared." To make this point clearer, let us compare the E-G correspondence in
(23) and the D-H correspondence in (24). The two correspondences mean differently: while
we need no phantom in sliced _ aU 1M bagtls in (23), we need one in the same position in (24).
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All examples in (23) and (24) are my modifications of those in McCawley (1988, p. 639).
(23) E: MalVin • sliced all the bagels carefully
I
F: MalVin • sliced all the bagels •
I
G: MalVin carefully sliced all the bagels •
(24) [); MalVin carefully sliced • all the bagels carefully
I
E: MalVin • sliced • all the bagels carefully
I
F: MalVin • sliced • all the bagels •
I
G: MalVin carefully sliced • all the bagels •
I I
H: MalVin • sliced carefully all the bagels •
Although the correspondences do not by themselves tell us any interesting properties of carefully,
my point is simply this: the one and the same surface form Maroin sliced all the bagels should
receive different analyses in (23) and (24). More specifically, there may not be a phantom in
between sliced and aU the bagels in (23), whereas there must be one in (24). To escape from a
contradiction, we say that phantoms are activated by contrast. Thus, it is H that activates phantom
in slice _ aU the bagels in (24).
In a few respects, phantoms are similar to empty categories. Both specify "potentials" for
instantiations oflexical items. But, in a sense, phantoms are more abstract than empty categories.
Indeed, all phantoms in F =Maroin· sliced· all the bagels· specify potential for the instantiation
of carefully. But they not only need not be empty categories, but also they cannot be. It is in
effect a contradiction to say that Adv (or AdVP) does not occur in slice _ aU the bagels in (23), on
the one hand, and that Adv occurs in (24), on the other. One might argue that the exact form
of F is like one in (24), since it is more general. But this is untenable. If phantoms are to be
identified as empty categories, then such a strange expression must be permitted as *Maroin
carefully sliced carefully aU the bagels carefully, which is instantiation of carefully in (24F) at all
potential positions at once, though D is acceptable for interesting reasons. 17
Also implied by this remark is that phantoms, unlike empty categories, are free from "labels."
The existence of phantoms, if activated, and their names are different matters. To put it more
adequately, labeling them is an extrinsic matter. We will return to this point in §4.8.
4.2 Relevance to Language Acquisition
It is remarkable that phantoms, presumably the super class of empty categories, can be predictable
from the fairly simple and straightforward principles of Maximal Partial Matches and Minimal
Partial Mismatches stated as (llA, B). But this is only a special consequence of the proposed
mechanism of pattern matching.
It is a very speculative idea, but I believe we may even think that pattern matching procedure
itself constitutes an essentialleaming procedure for language acquisition, though it is a higher-level
description of the pattern association that would actually take place on neural scales. Suppose a
English leamer, not necessarily a child, who knows only that the pattern instantiated by (23F) is
admissible. This state of knowledge does not preclude that other patterns are possible. The
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learner will eventually be exposed to other patterns that (23E) and (23G) instantiate. We may
suppose that what he or she will perform in his or her mind is the pattern matching illustrated
in (23), which serves as an optimization of the differences among (23E, F, G), for example. The
little linguist eventually knows that (24H) is also admissible. At this stage, he or she arrives at the
correspondence illustrated in (24), which is a further optimization of pattern correspondences.
Of course, the exact order of experiences is irrelevant, and furthermore the learning is probably
lexically based in conformity with "usage-based" model (Langacker 1988). This picture suggests
that generalization of surface forms/patterns are sufficient for language acquisition. I believe
this speculative scenario is fully compatible with Elman (1992) who shows that simple recurrent
PDP networks arrive at distinction among lexical categories and grammatical relations by learning
only positive evidence.
4.3 Positional and Lexical Mismatches
There is another kind of partial mismatches that should be taken into account. Consider the
correspondence between F and Gin (25).
(25) F: Many children like Mickey Mouse
I
G: Many children love Mickey Mouse
No phantom is necessary in, (25). since the relevant kind of mismatch is not positional. We say
that this kind of partial mismatch is lexical.
4.4 Pattern Marching Assumes No Identity In Meaning
We need a remark about such correspondences as in (25). Pattern matching is not exclusively
based on the notion of "meaning the same," if it is ever definable. Instead, we arc willing to
admit that there are many other kinds of relations that make patterns related to each other. In
this respect, we do by no means claim that F and G in (25) have no difference in what they say.
The contrary is true. We rather say that there is always a difference in meaning, no matter how
subtle, whenever there is a difference in form, positional or lexical. What we want to make clear
is thus simply that what formal difference leads to what semantic/pragmatic difference. Simply
put, difference in meaning is default, since we try to describe different kinds of relations among
forms. For this simple reason, none of our assumptions is weakened by the fact that, with
similarity on one hand, there is semantic/pragmatic difference between F and G, on the other.
Let me specify this point more clearly.
4.5 Default Difference In Meaning
We have a dilemma: it is trivially true that different forms have different meanings, but it is also
true that their meanings are not totally different. F and G in (25), for exam pie. are different
forms which have different meanings. But they also have a portion of meaning in common. To
escape from this dilemma, let us interpret the famous slogan, "all different forms have different
meanings," as the principle of default difference. Radically put, no different forms can never
have the same meaning. This must be a principle, or an axiom, simply because it is impossible
to account for why different forms ever have different meanings, without going into circularity.
But even if meanings of two forms are not so different, it does not follow that they have
exactly the same meaning. So motivated, our dilemma can be stated as the problem of to what
extent different meanings can be similar, namely of the degree of similarity in meaning, with
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"meaning almost the same" as a special ca~e of such similarity.18 Recall that nothing can be
identical to anything but itself. To be more explicit, let us furthermore interpret similarity as the
property of "loss of differences." Generally speaking, two different things are categorized as
iden tical only if all of their latent differences are dismissed.
4.6 Matching SCales
But there is yet another, more complex kind of partial mismatch, at least apparently. Compare
with cases like (25) those like (26) where lexical and positional mismatches take place at the
same time.
(26) P. Many children· like
I




It is attractive to treat the sequence befond ofas a sort of "lexical decomposition" of liIu (see
McCawley (1988, p. 656) for lexical decomposition). If this possibility is pursued, then we may
say that in such ca.~es as (27), there occurs "merging," without recourse to phantoms which
encode positional mismatches.
(27) P. Many children like Mickey Mouse
/1\
G: Many children are fond of Mickey Mouse
Let me emphasize, however, that such decision is not mutually exclusive, and it is quite misleading
to claim factually that there is no positional mismatch in (27). Leaving aside the issue of
whether they are synonymous, which I claim is not crucial, to dismiss positional mismatches is
equal to claim factually that sequences like be fond of are single words as like actually is, which
sounds quite odd.19
But this dilemma could be avoided easily if we introduce the notion of matching scales,
which I discussed briefly in §3.6. Units like befond ofand those like like have different matching
scales. If we compare F and G on the same scale W such that Uw= {many children, likes, Micke)'
Mous~. Uw= {many childrrn. a~ fond, of, Mickt), Mousel are definable. (26) is responsible for
pattern matching on this scale. But this does not preclude the existence of another scale Von
which we define U~ {many children, a~ fond of, Mickey Mous~ and compare F on W scale and G
on V scale, which (27) is responsible for. Scale shift is motivated (or constrained) by the
similarity of the meaning of like and befond of
4.7 Forms and Patterns
It is urgent to add that ff correspondences need not be stated exclusively on the lexical basis. A
crucial point is that in cases like (28) we are not forced to say that there are partial mismatches








shot her husband dead
I
is made ofmushroom
Though possible (and perhaps necessary in some cases), this does not exhaust the possibility of
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pattern matching: words and phrases are merely units of possible scales for pattern matching.
Pattern matching is also possible on other scales, larger or smaller, and probably there will be
no limit on the number of possible scales.to On larger scales, we may describe such pattern
matching as (29) and (30) specify.
(29) P. Fred believes X Y
I
G: Fred believes X Y'
(30) P. Fred believes Z
I
G: Fred believes Z'
where (i) X= that, (ii) Y= Liz TaylDr shot her husband dead and y'= the eanh is made of mushroom:.
and (iii) Z= X Y, and Z '= X Y·. Note that the scales for X Yand that for Z are different.
A notional distinction between fonns and patterns is helpful, though most linguists are not
aware of this, for they use the term "form" in the sense of "pattern." By "forms," I mean results
of formations that are exclusively made of lexical items. By "patterns," I mean strings that
contain one or more lexically uninstantiated variables with arbitrary labels like X, Y. Z. Patterns
have a variety of degrees of "abstractness," and the degree varies with the number of lexically
uninstantiated variables. Specification of variables is an empirical problem. So, strictly speaking,
Fred belieues X Y, Fred believes Z are patterns, not forms in the exact sense of the term. But I will
use the term form as loosely as the tradition oflinguistics allows.
4.8 Scales of Patterns and Their UnIts
Note however that the problem of what "labels" X and Y should have is a completely different
sort of problem. Plainly, it doesn't really matter whether or not X is "complementizer" (C),
whether Y is "sentence" (S), or "inflectional phrase" (lP), or "tense phrase" (TP). Similarly, it is
of little interest whether or not Z is "complementizer phrase" (CP). Nomenclature will be
helpful. and in some cases necessary. but it must be distinguished from a minimal requirement.
Minimally required in cases like (29) is the existential claim that there exist certain scales of
recognition on which units X and Y, on the one hand, and Z. on the other, are definable:
anything more than this must be independently motivated.
This does not mean, of course, that we may not label variables (including phantoms). What I
reject here is rather the conception of lexical items as instantiation of "syntactic categories." I
claim the reverse is true. Lexical items exist first, and categories, if any, are distributional
generalizations of them. This is, I contend, the view of language that is compatible with Elman
(1992) who demonstrated the PDP learnability of grammar.
The view of linguistic expressions advocated here also renders drastically the notion of
"syntactic structures." If there are ever such structures, they must be interactions of patterns on
a number of different scales. I claim that tree diagrams can capture only a limited portion of the
complex interactions of patterns across scales.
4.9 Synchronized Mismatches
The notion ofsynchronization of mismatches plays a crucial role to narrow our scope of investi-
gation in a desirable way. Without it, we would be forced to account for such kind of partial
mismatches as in (31) in terms of ff correspondence.
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There are. at least apparently, two mismatches in (31), but it is dull to attempt to describe such
cases in terms of ff correspondence. It is mainly because it is unlikely that this sort of cor-
respondences display real contrasts.
But how to justify this? The most plausible way to escape from this dullness is to rely on the
fact that the partial mismatches are not synchronized. As we have seen in (24), positional
mismatches are usually mutually exclusive. But this is not true of (31). In fact. given pattern X
hales Y, which is instantiated by F and G. lexical choices for variables X and Yare basically
independent of each other. F can contrasts with G'= Andy hales Carol, for example, without Andy
being forced to be other form. In short, two partial mismatches between F and Gin (31) are not
constraining each other, and are rather caused by free lexical variations of a single pattern X
hales Y. It is possible to describe these unsynchronized contrasts, but it would not provide so
many insights into ff correspondence. Let me clarify this point.
4.10 ALimitation on Pattern Matching Analysis
We have of course cases that indicate lexical selection is not completely free. To see this, it
would be sufficient to look at cases like (32) and (33), on the one hand, and cases like (34). on
the other.
(32) F: Andy hates Bill
I
?*G: Gravity hates Bill
(33) F: Andy hates Bill
I
?*G: Andy hates three hours
(34) *E: Andy hates Andy
I
F: Andy hates himself
I
*G: Andy hates him
It is important to note that pattern matching analysis has an obvious limit: since it is a theory of
ff correspondence, it cannot account for unacceptability of forms by itself. The reason is that
acceptability is a property definable on formations rather than correspondences: acceptability is
determined by simultaneous satisfaction of well·formedness conditions on formations. More
generally, any comparative method cannot account for well-formedness of what are being com-
pared. Thus, what we can do is to make use of unacceptable forms to describe how different
patterns interact with each other, rather than accounting for their acceptabilities. Bearing this
remark in mind; let us see some details of the correspondences.
What is responsible for the unacceptability of G-forms in (32) and (33) is so-called "selectional
restric:tions." Simply put, gravity is inappropriate for X in X hales Bill, on the one hand, and three
htnm for Y in Andy hates Y, on the other. By contrast, E and G in (34) exhibit so-called
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"crossover phenomena" (Postal 1971). E is usually unacceptable unless Andy as subject refers to,
say, Andy Watkins and Andy as the object refers to another Andy, Andy Baltimore. The same is
true of C-form: C is unacceptable unless him refers to some other person than Andy. The
deviance of Eand C in (34) are usually accounted for by Chomsky's (1981) Binding Conditions
C and B, respectively, though it is highly dubious whether it is successful.2\
As noted above. our pattern matching method does not provide any interesting viewpoint in
these cases: the reason is obvious simply that here is a problem of "formation," not of cor-
respondence. But let me make residual remarks.
It is unimportant, at least for our purposes, to distinguish selectional restrictions from
"co-occurrence restrictions" shown by the unacceptability of E and C in (34), though the
distinction is usually made according to whether deviance is caused by semantic or syntactic
factors. The strongest reason is that it is not clear what we could benefit from the distinction of
semantic and syntactic factors, both are possible only in idealized dimensions.
Recall that we have observed that in (24), carefully may not instantiate all occurrences of
phantoms at once in F= Marvin· sliced· ail the bagels • . But why such constraint on instantiation?
Since phantoms arc not empty categories, the reason cannot be purely structural. Rather, there
would be a general principle governing co-occurrence restrictions, or pattern composition in
general. I guess the principle is basically that no two words may appear in a minimal sentence if
they have the same reference, which is a stronger condition than Binding Condition C (+B),
since it includes all other categories than NP. So, what we have to account for is why such
reflexive forms as himselfin (34f) can escape from this restriction. But, to elaborate this idea, we
will need a general theory of pattern composition, which is beyond the scope of this paper. But
I am now working out this. I suggest here that such condition is necessary to avoid a short
circuit of pattern glues.
4.11 Manifold Correspondences and Topology of Contrasts
Another important feature that pattern matching provides us is that it permits us to characterize
manifold correspondences, namely complex interactions of correspondences among as many
forms as we want to see. Let us take for example the multiple correspondences in (35).
(35) -E': Fred believes of it • that [Bill is a liarj
I
E: Fred believes • • • that [Bill is a liarj
I I I I
F: Fred believes • Bill • • • lobe a liar
I
-F': Fred believes of Bill • • • to be a liar
I
?-C': Fred thinks of Bill • • • to be a liar
I
C: Fred thinks of Bill • • • as a liar
I I I
?-H: Fred thinks of it as tnu that [Bill is a limj
I I I
I: Fred takes • it for granted that [Bill is a liarj
Incidentally, the whole constitutes a sort of ring, since E' and I are linked.
Delaying relevant details until §4.13, let me specify our main point in advance. We can see in
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this manifold correspondence the way patterns partially overlap on each other: E and F contrast
with the partial mismatches (i) • - Bill, (ii) that-·, (iii) Bill-·, (iv) is - to be Likewise, F and *F'
contrast with respect to • - of F and G- do so with respect to believe - think. C and G with
respect to to be- as, and so on.
It is easy to see that patterns in (35) interact with each other in the manner that Lakoffs
(1987) calls "radial categories," on the one hand, and the manner that Langacker (1987) calls
"network," on the other.
Our main point is this: such manifold correspondences as in (35) illustrate how contrasts
shift from one pattern to another. Or, more adequately, they provide a chance to catch a
glimpse of the topology of contrasts, which makes us to state in what respect patterns are
"similar" and "dissimilar." Indeed, pattern matching analysis permits us to state manifold ff
correspondences among as many forms as we "ish to explore.n
By virtue of the capacity to visualize topological structure of patterns, our method is given an
excellent quality that, as far as I know. no other theoretical frameworks provide. at least systemat-
ically.u We are provided with a chance to understand the real diversity of patterns and the
complexity of their interactions.
4.12 ANote on the Complexity of Manifold Correspondences
The only undesirable consequence of manifold expressibility of ff correspondences is the difficulty
in conceiving their complexity on intuitive basis. For terminological convenience, we will say
that correspondences of a given form pair is onefold. since the number of correspondence is
one. Similarly. if we want to analyze the correspondences among three forms. then we have a
threefold correspondence. More generally, we have an (n-l) n/2-fold correspondence for a
given group of n forms. without taking degenerate correspondences into account. Since the
index (n-l) n/2 increases by the order of square. its potential complexity is manifest even in the
IT correspondences among five forms, E, F. G, H and I. as illustrated in Figure 2 which embodies
a tenfold cOITespondence.
Figure 2
In this figure. we distinguish direct correspondences (e.g.• F-H) by indicating them by solid
lines. from indirect ones (e.g.. G-l) by indicating them by dashed lines.
By this real complexity, however, I believe we will obtain more insights into syntactic phenomena
than lose sight in them.
4.13 What Is Really "Exceptional" In Exceptional Case Marking?
Let us return to the ff correspondences in (35), which reveals an interesting aspect about
complementation.
Pattern F is notorious for the "exceptional case-marking" of believe (Chomsky 1981). The
crucial question is why Bill in F behaves as object of believe There was a controversy as to
whether "subject-to-object raising" is involved or not. Generative semanticists (Postal 1974)
argued for it. and most interpretive semanticists argued against it, who insisted on Sdeletion,
because there iSJOT, Compo that is to be de1eted.24 Of course, such problem is unimportant for
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our concerns, simply because what we are doing is compare different formations, rather than
deriving F form E. So. even if (35) may seem to support subject-tCK>bject raising, it is a different
matter. Most crucially, we do not regard E as underlying form of F: they are simply different
forms constituting a pattern network.
Based on the topology of contrasts from E to H, we could observe that:
(i) There is a qualitative leap between E and F due to their difference in pattern scale;
(ii) Verbs of thinking, e.g., believe, think, conceive, demand as auxiliary case-marker ofinde-
pendently offorand that for complementation;
(iii) The unacceptability ofris exceptional (cf. G);
(iv) On this basis ,for infor-ro complement is probably not Comp any more than ofis;
(v) It follows either: (a) there is a "missing" preposition that the phantom in believe_ Bill
in F indicates, which case-marks Bill; or (b) the preposition is "incorporated" into the
sense of believe (cr. conceive (oj) X as Y).
It is suggested that what is really exceptional, if any. is that believe lacks auxiliary preposition to
mark NP. The last point of preposition incorporation will be discussed also in §4.17.
4.14 Measuring "Distances" among Patterns
From the manifold correspondence in (35), we can of course only catch a glimpse of how
patterns interact with each other. It is not only useful to investigate other interesting properties,
we can even measure the "distances" among patterns. In the case of (35). F= X believes. y. • to
be Z is distant from G= X thinks of y. • as Z, one the one hand, which is the nearest form that is
not unacceptable, by three contrasts, namely: (i) believe-think; (ii) • - of (iii) (to be) - as, and from
E= X believes • • • that Y is Z, by four contrasts, namely (i) Bill- ., (ii) • - that, (iii) • - Bill, and
(iv) to be - is, on the other. If we assume for simplicity that each contrast results in the same
amount of distance, then even if we do not take into account the disappearance of S-boundary
([ ... ]), it follows that pattern G is nearer to pattern F than pattern E is to F. Such measurement
of cross-pattern distances. though highly tentative, could be used. if elaborated further, as
quantitative. rather than qualitatively and intuitively based, evidence to characterize the "excep-
tional" behavior of believe. I think that this measurement technique seems worthy of elaborations
in future research.
4.15 Active, Causative, Passive and Statlve
Let us take for another example the active-passive correspondence. Compare the "direct" cor-
respondence between active and passive voices in (36) and the manifold correspondence among
active, passive, stative, and other related voices in (37), where the correspondence between F
andJare "indirect."
(36) F: Bill opened the door • • { fry !linueif}
*fry itseif
I
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(37) P. Bill opened the door • • { by himself}
"'by itself
I
G: Bill caused the door • open { by himself}
?'" by itself
I
G-: Bill let the door • f* by himself}open
by itself
I I
H: • • the door • opened {*by Bill}by itself
I
I: • • the door was open {*by Bill }
*by itself
I








The difference of (36) and (37) suggests that the active-passive association is a rather simplified
picture. Based on the distance measuring mentioned above, active-passive correspondence, if
any, contains a number of potential contrasts than expectable from their direct comparison. A
straightforward interpretation of (37) would be that active F is rather distant from passive j,
since there are at least four intennediate patterns G, G-, H, and I between them. The co-occurrence
restrictions on b»phrases is very suggestive.
Note however that G, G-, H, and I are not intennediate steps for derivation from F to j (or j
from F, if claimed). They are rather distinguishable patterns that constitute a network of patterns,
all of which have surface fonn status of their own.
4.16 No Need for "Logical Forms"
Although pattern matching analysis does not rely on the notion of underlying structure, yet it
can treat with the kind of ambiguity exhibited by sentences like (38).
(38) Many students read many books.
It is well known that (38) is two-way ambiguous!5 so that the following sentences are paraphrases
of (38), to which McCawley (1981, 1988) calls "pseudo-relatives."
(39) a.
b.
There are many students who read many books.
There are many books which many students read.
It is a commonplace to disambiguate the meanings of (39a, b) by translating them into so-called
"logical fonn," 3x(Fx). But the very fact that the relevant ambiguity can be paraphrased by the
sentences in (39) is sufficient enough. Indeed, without recourse to logical fonn, we can employ
(39a, b), all of which begin with thert an! many X, to contrast with each other, as in (40).
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(40) E: there are many books which many students read •
I I I
F: • • • many students read many books
I I I I
G: there are many students who • read many books
(41) 3 x Fx
It is striking to note the following points. As illustrated in (41), (i) the expression there are
corresponds to "existential quantifier," 3; (ii) the expression many N to "domain expression" to
be quantified by 3 to form 3x; (iii) if the phantoms inside relative clauses can be identified
with "bound variable," then wltexpressions function as a "pipe," especially when we employ
notation "3x IFx" which is familiar in UNIX shells.
We will not, however. attempt to account for why sentences like F can ever be ambiguous.
What we can assert is that pattern F activates the pattern network. If its activation settles on E,
we have the target reading for which E is responsible. If, alternatively, the activation settles on
G, we have the target reading for which G is responsible.
In short, if such multiple correspondence as in (40) is correct, then we can achieve the same
exactness as logical forms provide us, and, what is more, we can do it almost cost-free.
4.17 A/lematlon
At this final stage, let us return to our first example, (8), repeated here for convenience.
(8) F: They loaded bricks in the lmck • •
G: They loaded • •
I I
the tmck with bricks
What this correspondence claims is that, given general patterns F= X V Y P Z and G= X V Z r y
(e.g., P=in(to), Y=with), Z (=the truck) serves as the axis of figure/ground reversal in postverbal
configuration. It is noticeable that, in F, Y (=bricks) behaves as "figure," or "trajector" in the
sense of Langacker (1987), but, in G, it behaves as "ground," or "landmark," on the one hand,
and Z (=/he truck) behaves as ground in F, while it behaves as figure in G, on the other. This
point is evident from the opposition in meaning ofP=in and Y=with. More generally, postverbal
alternations like in (8) are not only IT correspondences but also mm correspondences mediated
by conceptual transformation (figure/ground reversal) on "container metaphor" (Lakoff and
Johnson 1980). In this respect, what we see here is not simply an alternation of patterns but also
an alternation of conceptual images. This will tme of other cases of alternation between Y P Z
and zr Y, where P=in, on; r=of, with.
We may integrate syntactic and semantic dimensions into such pattern images as illustrated
in Figure 3, where Vand P are conceived of as "trajectories," or vectors that dominate "domain"
D.
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\\'hat this figure embodies is that the F-G correspondence is an extension from F to G form in
that the sense of P (=PI+Pt) in F is "incorporated" into the meaning of V' in G, by which V
comes to dominate a new domain, 1\ in G, for the scope of predication. To describe this special
situation, we may say, rejecting the notion of derivation, that G is a pattern "based on" F.t6
Though the details of the figure are debatable, I think this is one of the best places where
pattern matching analysis meets cognitive semantics.
5. Concluding Remarks
It is unreasonable to want pattern matching analysis, intended as an integral part of cognitive
syntax, not to have any resemblance to any other theories of syntax. I had some linguists around
me who in fact objected to me, claiming that my version of cognitive syntax is not so different
from generative one. Surely, I must concede that this effort is in progress, and there is still
much to do. But I believe I have sketched so far a different and promising way of (re)doing
syntax. Although there are many similarities with other theories of syntax, there are far more
dissimilarities.
Probably, they objected to me, given that my presentation was not too obscure to convey real
meanings. only because they dislike whatever is called syntax. I have the impression that they
talked as if it were wrong to do syntax in any serious manner. Well, this is a matter of taste, and
there is no account of taste.
"No (more) formal syntax" seems to be the slogan bonding strongly current researchers in
cognitive grammar altogether, if I could say so. They seem to be gathering to fight a common
imaginary enemy, namely "syntax chauvinists."t7 Their reaction is partly reasonable. In most
theories of grammar or language or both, syntax was syntax, and semantics was semantics, if
anything.
I am willing to admit that cognitive linguistics is a set of elegant and effective theories of
semantics and pragmatics (Fauconnier 1985; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987,1991, among many
others) that is coming to maturity. But now, syntax and semantics/pragmatics are in mutual
segregation. The former does only a little of superficial semantics/pragmatics, and the latter
only a little of superficial syntax. But everything needs a good balance, I believe. I am afraid that
too strong reaction to generative linguistics might not oscillate everything to the other extreme
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side, the world of "semantics/pragmatics chauvinists," where any chance of reworking in syntax
cannot survive.
I believe LakofI's (1993) insights into phonology, on the one hand, and Karttunen's (1993)
appraisal of finitary means, opened a new way of redoing syntax, doing syntax differently. As
stated in introduction, this paper is a status report of my project of reworking in syntax.
I understand that I deviate from Lakoff (1993) in one noticeable point. I replaced what he
calls "constructions" by form-form correspondences, as distinguished from form-meaning cor-
respondences, which correspond to what Fillmore, Kay and O'Comer (1988), Goldberg (1995),
Lakoff (1987), and many other cognitive linguists call (grammatical) constructions. But this
deviation was necessary to meet the special requirement of syntax: to reject the notion of
"levels."
Some of us may remark that meaning is precluded (again) in pattern matching analysis. I
object to this. Meanings are always behind forms supporting any form-form correspondences. I
talked little about meaning only because meaning does not play the leading role of syntax. As
form should go background when we talk about meaning, meaning should go background
when we talk about form. This is just what "trclJector/Iandmark symmetry" demands.
I am willing to hold, as Langacker (1987) forcefully argues, that grammar has strong symbolic
basis. No doubt, any predicational relation is symbolic in its very nature. This is a crucial
property that characterizes most of grammar. But I would be more than mildly surprised if it is
claimed that all of grammar is symbolic. The reason is obvious: neither morphotactics (= syntax)
nor semotactics is symbolic; otherwise, no "information," in the exact sense of Shannon and
Weaver (1949), can never exist, nor can language exist, which is a contradiction to the fact
Straightfonvardly, semo(syn) tactics and morpho (syn) lactics are probably two different kinds
of tactic relation mediated by symbolization. In this respect, it is quite useful, and I argue
necessary, to distinguish form-form correspondences from form-meaning correspondences.
Form-meaning correspondences are, I think, too much emphasized in cognitive paradigm to
make us blind to the dimension of form-form correspondences. I regret this. If any theory of
language wants to be more comprehensive, more explanatory, and more faithful to brute facts,
it is sure that both form-meaning and form-form correspondences must be properly recognized
and characterized. None of them can be omitted in a well·articulated theory of language.
Notes
1. Karttunen's discussion is more thorough, I think. He not only advocates two-level rule 5}'Stems, but also assures
that they ne\~r have more (weak) generath~capacity than one-le\~1 rule 5}'Stems. More specifically, the disappearance
of rule ordering, cyclicity from rule systems counterbalances the increase in complexity of statements (Incidentally,
I could not figure out Lakofrs point until I understood, aftn-reading Karttunen, that constructions are two-level
rules.
2. This is a rather simplified picture. There is indeed a crucial condition to ensure this. This is what Karttunen
(1993) calls "finite·state constraint," which says that phonological a1lernations must be "regular relations."
3. Although I cannot be confident, Lakoff-Goldsmith style of three'level architecture of phonological S}'Slem is
dubious, since, if Karttunen (1993) is correCl, it follo\\'S thaI. if M-W and W-P correspondences are regular
relations, then M-P correspondence is also regular. That is, W·level is dispensable, at least formally, since M-P
correspondence are statable, according to the results ofJohnson (1972), Kaplan and K."\y (1982), and Koskenniemi
(1983).
4. For details ofautosegrnental phonology, see Goldsmith (1979).
5. This is not exactly what Lakoff presents. I replace his cross-hatches over corresponding lines by" • ".
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T
is one of terminal ones, S is an initial symbol. and F is a set of rewriting rules] is said to be of typt j if it satisfies
the corresponding restrictions in this list:
PO: No restrictions.
isl: Every rewriting rule in F has form QtA C4 => Q\P(4. with QI' ~. and P in (VN U VT)·' A E VN• and P ~ .A.,
except possibly for the rule S => A.. which may occur in F, in which case S does not occur on the right-hand
side of the rule.
i=2: Every rule in F has fonn A => p. where A E VN and P E (VN U VT )·.
i=3: Every rule in F has fonn either A => PB or A => p. where A, B E VNand P E VT·'
A language is said to be of typt j language if it is generated by a typt j grammar."
It is also known that every l:>'Pe 3 language can be described in foml of a regular expression. According to Revesz
. (1991, p. 39), "a regular expression over a finite alphabet Vis defined inductively as follows:
1) A. (i.e.• the empty string) is a regular expression.
2) a is a regular expression for every a in V.
3) If R is a regular expression over V. then 50 is (R)*.
4) IfQand R are regular expressions over V then so are (Q);(R) and (Q)/(R),
where symbols ".... ";", and "I" stands for the operations ofiteration. concatenation. and set union (or disjunction).
7. But, as Peters an Ritchie (1973) demonstrated. the class of transformational grammars defined in Chomsky
(1965) was type O.
8. Not surprisingly. we can devise a finite-state transducer to disprove Chomsky's (1957. pp. 21-23) argument tllat
sentences like If S, thm S, and If if S, then S, then S, If if S, thm if S, thm oS, cannot be generated by finite-state




This is my modification of Karttunen's (1993. p. 176, Fig. 6.2) transducer implementing • => ab/_b which
generates a [ab]" b from abo Another component, tither S or S is also describable by the same type of transducer.
Since finite-state transducers are composable. it is possible to two transducers of this kind to generate If tither S or S,
thm if tither S or S, thm S though I do not illustrate here.
9. I say this with preparation to have a lot of objections to this assertion. But I cannot help say this, because it
seems to me that cognitive grammarians tend to take syntax too lightly. as generative grammarians tend to take
semantics and pragmatics too lightly.
10. In general. iffconsists of n units, then the number of possible pieces offm correspondence is n(n+l)/2.
11. See also Lakatos and Musgrave. tds. (1970) for "research program" and other related notions.
12. See Feyerabend (19'70, 1974) for incommensurability.
13. See Mandelbrot 1977, 1983 for relevant notions of "scales" and "scaling."
14. We may furthermore tlunk that an optimal state is a "harmonious" states in the sense of Smolensky (1986). or
even "equilibrium" in the sense of Piaget (1971a, b). For this unexpected convergence of ideas. the reader is
advised to refer to Bates and Elman (1993). which is also quite useful to get a quick but adequate gasp of
conneclionbm.
15. This analysis is, to tell the truth. wrong. since it does not captures the correspondence between F=NP V NP P
NP (e.g.• Sam sent tJu leUer tejim) and G=NP bt V-m P NP by NP (e.g., ?Tht leUerwas smt tojim by Sam) and G -=NP bt
V-m NP ("'te) (e.g., ??Sam was sent tJuktter by jim). We would have a better analysis if we assume that passive and
active forms are so different patterns that there are no partial exact matches between them. and that what
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;u.,ociates them is not syntax but pragmatically based inferences.
16. More specifically, -en is probably an "anticausative" morpheme. This point is also relevant to the alternatin
between Y P Z and Z po Y that we will discuss later. In thise case, P (e.g., in) and p' (e.g., oj) are conceptual vectors
that point to opposite directions.
17. For intriguing semantics of adverbs, the reader is advised to consult McCawley (1988, ch. 19).
18. Note incidentally that transformational analyses, assuming deep structures, are forced to approach the same
problem from the oppO!ite direction, since they stipulate "default identity" in meaning. So, it must specify differences
if there are any.
19. Incidental1y, Lakoff (1993, p. 122) does not hesitate to incorporate the notion of "merging" into his cognitive
phonology framework. The exact status of merging is questionable, and we will need more careful treatment,
especially as to whether or not it really involves positional mismatches in the case of syntax.
20. It is \'ery imponant to note that there is invariance ofpatterns across scales. For evidence, when pattern X V Y (V
is \'erb, X, Yare NP) is identified on 5-scale (hence SOV.language), patterns on all other scales tend to conform to
it. Super-5entence patterns such as X if Y, X whm Y, X becauu Y (X, Yare S's) conform to 5-scale analogue. and
P-5ca1e pattern X of Y (X, Yare NP's), too. Also on W-5Cale, we find pattern X S Y(S is stem, X, Yare affIxes). Even
on far more smal1er scale of syllables, we find X V Y (V is vowel and X, Yare consonant clusters). This interesting
parallelism is usually expressed in terms of so-called Xtheol)" (Chomsky 1972,jackendoff 1977), but it is gratuitous
to identify such invariance emerges as a manifestation of "universal grammar: since it does not provide its
explanation in a serious sense. A milder, and we believe more plausible, assumption is of course that such
imariance is a scaling effect (Mandelbrot 1977, 1983) that we can expect from the optimization process in neural
networks.
21. Postal (Huck and Goldsmith. 1995, pp. 141-142) criticizes this line of approach as follows: "Chomsk)' [1981:
193] has argued that Principle C of this so-cal1ed Binding Theory explains the strong crossover phenomenon first
discussed in Postal 1971. Roughly, this principle claims that a "referring expression" cannot be bound. The claim is
thus that the crossover facts can be deducible from this principle. But this fails resoundingly. First, since the
Binding Theory only characterizes noun phrases, Chomsky's Principle C treatment entails that no strong crossover
effects can be induced by extraction of prepositional phrases, thereby falsely distinguishing the equally impossible
·To whom did h~ say [gav~ the book and • Who did /~ say [gau~ 1M boolc 10, where Mand who or "whom" are supposed to
be coreferential.[a note omitted] Second, Chomsky's supposed explanation also ignores the fact that there is an
asymmetry in the phenomenon. Roughly, it only exists when an antecedent is extracted, not a pronominal form;
thus, a Principle C approach fails to distinguish ·in-orne, [ convinced him [would hire (where imJme and him are
supposed to be coreferential) from Myu/f, [ can't htgin to !mder:stand, wrongly blocking both.[another note omitted]"
22. In this respect, our method could be compared to "comparative anatomy' in biology. Comparative anatomy is a
method of biological study by which structures of animal bodies are compared on the homological basis. It enables
biologists to explore the di\'ersity of animals not only at the level of species but also at higher 1C\'eIs, e.g., genus,
family, class. Thus, if this analogy is correct, our method can be considered as not only "analogically" based in mm
correspondence, but also is "homologically based," in terms of ff correspondence.
23. A number of crucial properties of pattern networks may be accounted for in terms of well-aniculated semantics
and pragmatics, since, as noted earlier, ff correspondences are supponed by "hidden" mOl correspondences. But 1
feel it is an overestimation to naively claim that all of the properties of pattern networks could be accounted for in
terms of fm correspondences. One ob\ious reason is that there can be, and I beliC"e is, a distinct kind of similarity
among patterns in themselves.
24. Bach (1977) is a good suryey of the controversy. To avoid confusion, it must be mentioned here that this
position is abandoned in "minimalist program" (Chomsky 1995) which is incompatible in many nontri\ial respects
with deceased "revised extended standard theory" (Chomsky 1977) and its descendent "government-binding"
framework (Chomsky 1981).
25. I omit here two other readings, one of which is a very marginal reading that corresponds to Thu~ ar~ many ways
in which a student nods a booJt. This ~iIl require the notion of generalized quantifier. since many binds both of the
determiners of" sludtnl and" book. Another is a simple e\'ent reading, Then occurs an rom in which many students I?ad
many booIcs. This reading is dominant in past tense sentences. For evidence, l\'hen I entnord tM library', many sludtnts
nad many boohsreceives primarily this event reading, and marginally receives other logical readings.
26. See Lakoff (1987, p. 555) for the distinction of "base on" from "derived from."
27. This witty locution is brought 10 me byYamanashi (p.c.).
115
Papers in Linguisitics Science No.2
References
Bach, Emmoll W. 1977. Review article of On Raisingby Postal. Language 53 (3): 621-654.
Bates, Elizabeth A., and Jeffrey L. Elman. 1993. Connectionism and the study of change. In
Brain Droelapment and Cognition: A &ader, edited by M. H.Johnson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Chomsky, Noam. 1956. Three models for the description of language. IRE Transactions on
Infannation Theory. 2 (3): 1l~124.
__, 1957. Syntactic StructUTf!S. The Hague: Mouton and Co.
__.1965. Aspects of the Theory ofSyntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
__' 1970. Remarks on Nominalization. In Readings in English Transfonnational Grammar, edited
by R. AJacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum. Waltham, MA/Tronto/London: Ginn and Company.
__. 1973. Conditions on transformations. In A Festschrift for Morris Halle, edited by S. R.
Anderson and P. Kiparsky. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
__.1975. The Logical Structure ofLinguistic Theory. New York: Plenum Press.
__.1977. Essays onFann and Interpretation. New York: North Holland.
__, 1981. Lectures on Government and Binding: The Pisa Lectures. Berlin/New York: Mouton de
Gruyter.
__. 1995. The Minimalist Program Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
__, and Morris Halle. 1968. The Sound Pallern ofEnglish. First MIT paperback edition in 1991.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Davis, Steven, ed. 1992. Connectionism: Theory and Practice. New York/Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Elman,Jeffrey L. 1992. Grammatical structure and distributed representations. In Connectionism:
Theory and Practice, edited by S. Davis. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Fauconnier, Gilles R. 1994. Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [First 1985]
Feyerabend, Paul K. 1970. Consolations for the specialist. In Criticism and the Growth ofKnowledge,
edited by 1. Lakatos and A E. Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
__. 1974. Against Method: Outline of An Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. London: New Left
Books.
Fillmore, Charles j., Paul Kay, and Catherine O'Connor. 1988. Regularity and idiomaticity in
grammatical constructions: The case of let alone. Language 64: 501-538.
Goldsmith,John. 1979. AutosegmentalPhonowgy. New York: Garland Press.
__' 1992. Local modelling in phonology. In Connectionism: Theory and Practice, edited by S.
Davis. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
__' ed. 1993. The Last Phonowgical Rule.' RLJledions on Constraints and Derivations. Chicago:
U':liversity of Chicago Press.
Halle, Morris, and George N. Clements. 1983. Problem Book in Phonowgy. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Hanson, N. R.1958. Patterns ofDiscuuery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Huck, Geoffrey j., andJohn A Goldsmith. 1994. Ideowgy and Linguistic Theory: Noam Chomsky and
the Deep Structure Debates. London: Routledge.
Jackendoff, Ray S. 1977. X-bar Syntax: A Study ofPhrase Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Johnson, C. Douglas. 1972. Fonnal Aspects ofPhonological Description. The Hague: Mouton.
Kaplan, Ronald M., and Martin Kay. 1981. Phonowgical rules andfinite-state transducers (Abstract),
Linguistic Society ofAmerica Meeting Handbook. New York: Linguistic Society ofAmerica.
Karttunen, Lauri. 1993. Finite-state constraints. In The Last Phonological Rule: &flections on
Constraints and Derivations, edited byJ. Goldsmith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
116
Kuroda: Pattern Matching Analysis
Koskenniemi, Kimmo. 1983. Two-level Morpholog)~ A General Computational Model for Wordform
Recognition and Production. Department of General Linguistics. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.
Lakatos, Imre. 1970. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by I. Lakatos and A. E. Musgrave. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
__. 1977. The Methodology ofScientifiC Research Prog;rams: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1 Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind.
Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago Press.
__. 1993. Cognitive phonology. In The Last Phonological Rule: Reflections on Constraints and
Derivations, edited byj. Goldsmith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
__, and Mark H.Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Langacker, Ronald W. 1987. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol. 1: Theoretical Prerequisites.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
__. 1988. A usage-based model. In Topics in Cognitive Linguistics, edited by B. Rudzka-Cstyn.
Amsterdam/Philadelphia:John Benjamins Publishing Co.
__.1991. Foundations ofCognitive Grammar, Vol. 2. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Mandelbrot, Benoit B. 1977. Fractals: Form, Chance, and Dimension. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
__. 1983. Fractal Geometry ofNatuTl!. New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.
McCawley, james D. 1981. The syntax and semantics of English relative clauses. Lingua 53:
99-149.
__. 1988. The Syntactic Phenomena in English, Vol. I and II. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
McClelland, james L., David E. Rumelhart, and The PDP Research Group. 1986. Parallel Distributed
Processing-Explorations i71 the Microstructure oj Cognition, Vol. 2: Psychological and Biological
Models. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Peters, P. Stanley, and Robert W. Ritchie. 1973. On the generative power of transformational
grammars. Information Science 6: 49-83.
Piaget,jean. 1971a. Biology and Knowledge. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
__. 1971b. The epigenetic system and the development of cognitive functions. In Brain
Development and Cognition: A Reader, edited by M. H.Johnson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Postal, Paul Martin. 1971. Crossover Phenomena. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
__. 1974. On. Raising: One Rule ofEnglish Grammar and its Theoretical Implications. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Revesz, Gyorgy E. 1991. Introduction to Formal Languages. New York: Dover Publications.
Rosenbaum, Peter S. 1967. The Grammar ofEnglish Predicate Complement Constructions. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Ross,John Robert 1986. Infinite Syntax! Norwood, NJ: Ablex. [Publication of Ross (1967) Constraints
on Variables in Syntax. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. MIT].
Rumelhart, David E., James L. McClelland, and The PDP Research Group. 1986. Parallel Distributed
Processing - Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, VoL 1: Foundations. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Shannon, Claude Elwood, and Warren Weaver. 1949. The Mathematical Theory' of Communication.
Urbana: Universi ty of I1Ii nois Press.
Smolensky, Paul. 1986. Infonnation processing in dynamical systems: Foundations of hannony
theory. In Rumelhart,j. E. McClelland and The PDP Research Group (1986).
Yamanashi, Masa-aki. 1995. Ninchi-bumpo Ron [Studies in Cognitive Grammar1Tokyo: Hitsuji
Shobo.
117
